Thomson
S. A. v. Quixote Corp.
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Fed. Cir).
January 25, 1999
BACKGROUND
While your patent application is pending before the United States
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), the Examiner sends you notice
that your patent application has entered into an interference proceeding.
Your patent practitioner urges you to provide evidence relating
to the date when the claimed invention was conceived of, reduced
to practice and showing diligence between those dates. Your patent
practitioner notes that it is important to have this evidence corroborated,
preferably by a non-inventor. After reviewing a large stack of laboratory
notebooks, you note that many of the key pages are not signed, dated
or witnessed.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In this case relating to the validity of patents directed to optical
information storage devices such
as CD's, the District Court and the Fed. Cir. were faced with determining
whether testimony of
inventors not a party to, or having an interest in, an action for
infringement requires corroboration under 35 U.S.C. 102(g). At issue
was testimony by non-party inventors as to non-patented inventive
activity under 35 U.S.C. 102(g). The Fed. Cir. held that corroboration
is required only when the testifying inventor is asserting a claim
of derivation or priority of his or her invention and is a named
party, an employee of or assignor to a named party, or otherwise
is in a position where he or she stand to directly and substantially
gain by his or her invention being found to have priority over the
patent claims at issue.
The Practice Pointer to be gained from this case is that it is
very beneficial to have corroboration of evidence of the conception,
diligence and reduction to practice a routine part of an organization's
procedures.
THE LAW
35 U.S.C. 102(g) provides that a person shall be entitled to a patent
unless:
(g) before the applicant's invention thereof the invention was
made in this country by another who had not abandoned, suppressed,
or concealed it. In determining priority of invention there shall
be considered not only the respective dates of conception and reduction
to practice of the invention, but also the reasonable diligence
of one who was first to conceive and last to reduce to practice,
from a time prior to conception by the other.
The totality of the evidence is considered to determine whether
the requirements of 35 U.S.C.
102(g) are satisfied by the clear and convincing standard. See Price
v. Symsek, 26 USPQ2d 1031 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
The Fed. Cir. has often held that in interference and infringement
lawsuits that an inventor's testimony alone respecting the facts
surrounding a claim of derivation or priority of invention cannot
satisfy the clear and convincing standard without corroboration
due to the skepticism of uncorroborated inventor testimony when
the inventor has an interest in the outcome. See Cooper v. Goldfarb,
47 USPQ2d 1896 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Woodland Trust v. Flowertree Nursery,
Inc., 47 USPQ2c 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1998). However, neither the Fed.
Cir. or the United States Supreme Court have addressed the issue
raised in the current case. In the current case the Fed. Cir. noted
that: the purported inventors who testified were non-parties and
their testimony concerned unpatented prior invention. Although Thomson
argues that the corroboration rule is justified here because both
testifying witnesses were involved in business that supplied goods
and services to Quixote, this does not rise to the level of self-interest
required to justify triggering application of the corroboration
rule. In fact, Thomson's only reference to the record showing this
potential source of bias is a transcript of Thomson's cross examination
of one of the witnesses, which means that the jury had the necessary
facts to assess the credibility of the witnesses. |