Elk
Corporation of Dallas v. GAF Building Materials Corporation
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Fed. Cir).
February 11, 1999
BACKGROUND
In the course of evaluating the patentability of your new design
invention, a search is performed in the technical and patent literatures
by your technical staff and an outside patent search firm. You review
the results of this search, and write a letter to your patent practitioner
providing copies of the search results and note that certain references
are particularly close to your invention. A design patent application
is timely filed. You note that an Information Disclosure Statement
filed in the application does not list the references that you noted
were particularly close to the invention and notify your patent
practitioner.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In this case relating to design patents for roofing shingles, the
district court and the Fed. Cir. were faced with determining whether
the failure to disclose certain references to the United States
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) that were obtained during a
patentability search for the design patent application amounted
to inequitable conduct. Based on the materiality of the references,
memorandum indicating the materiality of the references, arguments
made before the USPTO and citing the references to the USPTO in
a later-filed and related application, the district court held the
patent unenforceable. The Fed. Cir. affirmed. The Practice Pointer
to be gained from this case is that care should be taken to assure
that appropriate references are provided to the USPTO during the
prosecution of utility and design patent applications.
THE LAW
Under 37 C.F.R. 1.56, individuals associated with the filing or
prosecution of a patent
application before the USPTO must submit information material to
the patentability of the pending claims. Such individuals include
each inventor, each attorney or agent who prepares or prosecutes
the application, and every other person substantively involved in
the preparation or prosecution of the application. Inequitable conduct
due to failure to disclose material information must be proved by
clear and convincing evidence of: 1) prior art that was material,
2) knowledge chargeable to an applicant of that prior art and of
its materiality, and 3) failure of the applicant to disclose the
art resulting from an intent to mislead the USPTO. See Molins PLC
v. Textron, Inc., 33 USPQ2d 1823 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
Information is material when there is a substantial likelihood
that a reasonable examiner wold have considered the information
important in deciding whether to allow the application to issue
as a patent. See Molins. However, an otherwise material reference
need not be disclosed if it is merely cumulative of or less material
than other references already disclosed. See Halliburton Co. v.
Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 17 USPQ2d 1834 (Fed. Cir. 1991) and Baxter
Int'l, Inc. v. McGaw, Inc., 47 USPQ2d 1225 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Knowledge
of the materiality of information can be determined from the evidence,
such as the patentability search reports and memorandum that were
of record in the present case. The intent to mislead the PTO can
be proven by direct evidence, or can be inferred the facts and circumstances
surrounding an applicant's overall actions. See Merck & Co.
v. Danbury Pharm., 10 USPQ2d 1682 (Fed. Cir. 1989) and Paragon Podiatry
Lab., Inc., v. KLM Lab., Inc., 25 USPQ2d 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993) The
greater the degree of materiality, the less the degree of intent
that must be shown to reach a conclusion of inequitable conduct.
See Critkon, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc., 43
USPQ2d 1666 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
IMPORTANCE OF THE CASE
This case is important because it accentuates the need to evaluate
information obtained, known, evaluated and commented upon by all
parties involved in the patenting process. |